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Abstract
This study explores a novel channel for monetary policy to impact growth and
welfare through fertility choice. In a scale-invariant Schumpeterian growth model
with endogenous fertility and a cash-in-advance constraint on consumption, we nd
a positive e¤ect of an increase in the nominal interest rate on fertility. The increase
in fertility decreases labor supplied to production and R&D, which in turn decreases
long-run growth. Calibration shows that long-run growth increases 0.12% by reduc-
ing the nominal interest rate from 9.6% to 0%, and the welfare gain is equivalent to
a permanent increase in consumption of 3.14%. As an empirical test, we build panel
data for 12 advanced countries during 20002014. We use the degree of central bank
independence and money growth as the instruments for ination. We nd that the
e¤ect of ination on population growth is positive and signicant in instrumental
variables estimation. Our results remain robust to using birth rate or fertility rate
as the dependent variable. An increase in annual ination of 1 percentage point
would bring an increase of 0.06 percentage point in the annual growth of the total
population. Our empirical ndings provide support for our theory.
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1 Introduction
Researchers have studied many issues concerning fertility (discussed below). In this paper
we reveal a novel channel fertility choice through which monetary policy may impact
growth and welfare. It may sound counter-intuitive to investigate the e¤ect of monetary
policy on population growth (i.e., to link peoples fertility choice to monetary policy).
However, if humans were rational, they would also optimize their fertility decision to-
gether with the other choices such as consumption and investment. In a scale-invariant
Schumpeterian growth model with endogenous fertility and a cash-in-advance (CIA) con-
straint on consumption, we nd that an increase in the nominal interest rate has a positive
e¤ect on fertility, which in turn decreases long-run growth. As an empirical test, we build
panel data for 12 advanced countries during 20002014. We nd that ination has a sig-
nicant, positive e¤ect on population growth in instrumental variables (IV) estimation,
which provides support for our theory. The motivation of our paper is as follows.
First, our study o¤ers a novel channel fertility choice/population growth for mone-
tary policy to impact economic growth and social welfare. Population growth is assumed
to be exogenous within the existing R&D-driven growth-theoretic framework (e.g., Mar-
quis and Re¤ett, 1994; Chu and Cozzi, 2014; Chu et al., 2015; Chen, 2015; He, 2015;
Huang et al., 2015; Chu et al., 2016; Chu et al., 2017; Chu et al., 2018). The only ex-
ception is Chu, Cozzi, and Liao (2013), who have endogenized fertility choice and human
capital accumulation in Schumpeterian growth models. Our study complements theirs by
further analyzing the e¤ect of monetary policy on fertility choice. Doing so reveals that
monetary policy may have an impact on peoples fertility choice, which in turn a¤ects
long-run growth and welfare. Therefore, our study helps us to understand the entire
mechanism through which monetary policy may impact long-run growth and welfare.
Second, our study helps in understanding the long-run dynamics of total population.
In many studies total population growth is regarded as exogenous (e.g., population growth
is treated as an exogenous instrument for international trade in evaluating its causal e¤ect
on income; see discussion in Frankel and Romer, 1999). Researchers have investigated
many issues related to fertility. For instance, Li, Zhang, and Zhu (2008) and Rosenzweig
and Zhang (2009) have tested the quantity-quality trade-o¤ in having children. The uni-
ed growth framework has endogenized peoples fertility in explaining the long-run growth
and population dynamics (e.g., Galor and Mountfold, 2008; Strulik and Weisdorf, 2008).
Our study complements the existing studies by endogenizing peoples fertility within a
Schumpeterian growth framework, similar to Chu, Cozzi, and Liao (2013). However, in
existing studies, the role of monetary policy is ignored. Considering monetary policy is
important because there is always a trade-o¤ between consumption and raising children
when parents are rational. Monetary policy is one important exogenous factor that may
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impact the trade-o¤ faced by each rational individual. Moreover, by taking our model to
data, we can test the e¤ect of the ination rate (a proxy for monetary policy) on the fertil-
ity rate to check the validity of our theory and further evaluate the importance/magnitude
of the channel that we emphasize. In other words, we can also evaluate how much our
channel (the monetary policy) can explain total population growth. This not only helps
us to understand the long-run dynamics of the total population but also has rich policy
implications.
The intuition of our results is as follows. We introduce money via a CIA constraint
on consumption into a Schumpeterian growth model, following Chu and Cozzi (2014).
With exogenous population growth, the nominal interest rate has no e¤ect on economic
growth when there is an inelastic labor supply (see also Chu and Cozzi, 2014). With an
inelastic labor supply, a higher nominal interest rate would not distort the labor supply
through consumption-leisure choice (i.e., the choice for leisure is absent). When the CIA
constraint applies only on consumption (i.e., not on R&D labor or manufacturing), a
higher nominal interest would not distort the allocation of labor between manufacturing
and R&D, leaving the balanced growth rate una¤ected. In contrast, with endogenizing
fertility choice, in choosing optimal fertility, households equate the marginal utility of
fertility to the marginal cost of fertility. The marginal cost of fertility consists of three
terms: the asset-diluting e¤ect of fertility, the foregone-wage e¤ect of fertility, and the
real money balance-diluting e¤ect, all of which depend negatively on the nominal interest
rate due to the CIA constraint on consumption. Therefore, all else being equal, a higher
nominal interest rate decreases the marginal cost of fertility and thereby increases fertility.
In other words, a higher nominal interest rate and thereby a higher ination rate via the
CIA constraint on consumption makes fertility cheaper relative to consumption, thus
increasing fertility. The increase in fertility decreases the amount of labor supplied to
production and R&D, leading to a decreased long-run growth.
We calibrate the model to estimate the growth and welfare e¤ects of a change in
the nominal interest rate. We nd that long-run growth increases 0.12% by reducing
the nominal interest rate from 9.6% (the sample mean, elaborated below) to 0%. The
corresponding welfare gain is equivalent to a permanent increase in consumption of 3.14%.
As a counterfactual, we nd that the growth and welfare losses are smaller when people
prefer more children. Additionally, there are substantial growth and welfare losses when
peoples preference for children increases, all else being equal.
As an empirical test, we build panel data for 12 advanced countries during 2000
2014. We use the degree of central bank independence (CBI) and money growth as the
instruments for ination. We nd the following. The e¤ect of ination on population
growth is positive and signicant in IV estimation. Our results remain robust to using
birth rate or fertility rate as the dependent variable. Our empirical ndings provide
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support for our theory. Additionally, we nd that an increase in annual ination of one
percentage point would bring an increase of 0.06 percentage points in annual growth of the
total population. Given the average annual ination rate of 2.71% in our data sample,
ination explains 0.17% annual growth in the total population (approximately 20% of
the average 0.89% annual growth rate in total population in the 12 advanced economies
during 20002014). Therefore, the magnitude of the estimated e¤ect of ination on total
population growth is large.
This study relates to the large body of literature on fertility/population growth and
its e¤ect on the economy (see Nishimura and Zhang, 1992; Davies and Zhang, 1997, and
references therein).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the monetary Schum-
peterian growth model to analyze the fertility and growth e¤ects of monetary policy.
Section 3 provides the empirical evidence. The nal section concludes the paper.
2 A Monetary Schumpeterian Model with Endoge-
nous Fertility
Built on existing studies (e.g., Chu and Cozzi, 2014; He and Zou, 2016), we introduce
money with a CIA constraint on consumption into a Schumpeterian growth model.
2.1 Households
There is a unit continuum of identical households. At time t, the population size of each
household is Lt. There is a unit continuum of identical households, which have a lifetime
utility function as
U =
Z 1
0
e t [ln (ct) +  ln (nt)] dt, (1)
where ct is per capita real consumption of nal goods (numeraire) and nt is the per capita
number of births at time t.  > 0 is the rate of time preference, and  > 0 governs
peoples preference for children. Following Chu et al. (2013), we assume zero mortality.
Therefore, the population growth rate is also nt (i.e.,

Lt=Lt = nt).
Each household maximizes its lifetime utility given in equation (1) subject to the
asset-accumulation equation given by

at +

mt = (rt   nt) at + wt

1  nt


  ct   (t + nt)mt +  t, (2)
where at is the real value of equity shares in monopolistic intermediate goods rms owned
by each member of households; rt andwt are the rate of real interest and wage, respectively.
Each person has one unit of time endowment to allocate between work and fertility. The
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time used in raising children is given by nt= < 1, where  is a parameter measuring the
time cost of raising children (following Chu et al., 2013). ct is per capita consumption.
mt is the real money balance held by each person, and t is the cost of holding money
(i.e., the ination rate). In (2), each person also receives a per capita lump-sum transfer
of the seigniorage revenue  t from the government (or pay a lump-sum tax if  t < 0). The
CIA constraint is given by ct  mt.
The no-arbitrage condition is it = t + rt, where it is also the nominal interest rate.
Standard dynamic optimization (see the Appendix) yields the optimality condition for
consumption as
1
ct
= t (1 + it) , (3)
where t the Hamiltonian co-state variable on (2). The intertemporal optimality condition
is
 

t
t
= rt   nt   . (4)
The optimality condition for fertility is

nt
= t

at +
wt

+mt

. (5)
2.2 Final-Goods Sector
The nal-goods sector is competitive. The production function of the nal-goods rms is
given by
yt = exp
Z 1
0
lnxt (j) dj

, (6)
where xt (j) denotes intermediate goods j 2 [0; 1]. The nal goods rms maximize their
prot, taking the price of each intermediate good j, denoted pt (j), as given. The demand
function for xt (j) is
xt (j) = yt=pt (j) . (7)
2.3 Intermediate-Goods Sector
As clearly elaborated in Chu and Cozzi (2014), there is a unit continuum of industries
producing di¤erentiated intermediate goods. Each industry is temporarily dominated by
an industry leader until the arrival of the next innovation, and the owner of the new
innovation becomes the next industry leader. The leader in industry j has the following
production function:
xt(j) = 
qt(j)Lx;t(j). (8)
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The parameter  > 1 is the step size of an improvement in productivity, and qt(j) is
the number of productivity improvements that have occurred in industry j as of time t.
Lx;t(j) is the production labor in industry j. Equation (8) adopts a cost-reducing view of
vertical innovation, as pointed out by Chu and Cozzi (2014). Given qt(j), the marginal
cost of production for the industry leader in industry j is mct(j) = wt=qt(j).
Standard Bertrand price competition leads to a prot-maximizing price pt (j) deter-
mined by a markup  (the step size of innovation) over the marginal cost. The amount
of monopolistic prot is
t (j) =

   1


pt (j)xt (j) =

   1


yt. (9)
The labor income from production is
wtLx;t(j) =

1


pt (j)xt (j) =

1


yt. (10)
2.4 Research Arbitrage
Research arbitrage is similar to Chu and Cozzi (2014). In a symmetric equilibrium, we
have t (j) = t. We denote vt (j) as the value of the monopolistic rm in industry j. In
a symmetric equilibrium, vt (j) = vt. The no-arbitrage condition for vt is
rtvt = t +

vt   tvt. (11)
Equation (11) says that the return on holding an innovation, rtvt, equals the sum of the
ow prot of innovation, t, and potential capital gain (

vt), less the expected capital loss,
tvt, where t is the arrival rate of the next innovation.
Following Chu and Cozzi (2014), the zero-expected-prot condition of R&D rm k 2
[0; 1] in each industry is
t (k) vt = wtLr;t(k), (12)
where Lr;t(k) is the amount of labor hired by R&D rm k, and the rm-level innovation
rate per unit time (i.e., t (k)) is t (k) =
'
Lt
Lr;t(k), where ' is a constant. This assumption
is made to remove the scale e¤ect of total population on steady-state growth (see also
Chu and Cozzi, 2014; Laincz and Peretto, 2006). The aggregate arrival rate of innovation
is
t =
Z 1
0
t (k) dk =
'
Lt
Nr;t = 'lr;t, (13)
where we dene a transformed variable lr;t  Lr;t=Lt (the share of R&D labor in total
population). Similarly, the share of production labor would be lx;t = Lx;t=Lt.
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2.5 Monetary Authority
The monetary authority exogenously chooses the monetary growth rate

M t=Mt. It is
equivalent to the case in which the nominal interest rate is chosen as the policy instrument
because it =

M t=Mt+. The derivation is as follows. We havemt =Mt=(PtLt), where Pt is
the price of nal goods and

P t=Pt = t. Therefore, we have

mt=mt =

M t=Mt 

P t=Pt nt.
On the balanced growth path, mt and ct grow at the same rate gt. Using equation (4),
we have gt = rt   nt   . Taken together, we have

M t=Mt  

P t=Pt   nt = rt   nt   .
Given it = t + rt, we have it =

M t=Mt + .
2.6 General Equilibrium
As in Chu and Cozzi (2014), the general equilibrium is a time path of prices fpt (j) , rt, wt, it, vtg
and allocations fct, mt, nt, yt, xt (j) , Lx;t (j) , Lr;t (k)g, which satisfy the following condi-
tions at each instance of time:
 households maximize utility taking prices frt, wt, itg as given;
 competitive nal-goods rms maximize prot taking fpt (j)g as given;
 monopolistic intermediate-goods rms choose fLx;t (j) , pt (j)g to maximize prot
taking fwtg as given;
 R&D rms choose fLr;t (k)g to maximize expected prot taking fwt, it, vtg as given;
 the labor market clears (that is, Lx;t + Lr;t = Lt

1  nt


);
 the nal-goods market clears (that is, yt = ctLt);
 the value of monopolistic rms adds up to the value of households assets (i.e.,
vt = atLt).
 the CIA constraint binds: ct = mt.
2.7 Balanced Growth Path
Because balanced growth rate is pinned down by the share of labor employed by R&D
rms, we solve for the equilibrium labor allocation. The equilibrium labor allocation is sta-
tionary on a balanced growth path. Using conditions

vt=vt = g+ n, t = (+ )wtLr;t,
(9), (10), (12), and (13), we end up with
(   1) lx = (lr + =') . (14)
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The labor market clearing condition is
lr + lx = 1  n

. (15)
Solving (14)-(15) yields the equilibrium labor allocation as
lr =
(   1)


1  n

+

'

  
'
, (16)
lx =
1


1  n

+

'

. (17)
In this paper we focus exclusively on the balanced growth path. Plugging equation
(8) into (6), we have
yt = exp
Z 1
0
qt (j) dj ln 

Lx = exp
Z t
0
vdv ln 

Lx = ZtLx, (18)
where Zt  exp
R t
0
vdv ln 

is the level of aggregate technology. The growth rate of Zt
is
gz = t ln  = 'lr;t ln , (19)
which is linear in the share of labor employed by R&D rms, as in standard Schumpeterian
growth models (see e.g., Aghion and Howitt, 1998, ch. 2; Chu and Cozzi, 2014). On
the balanced growth path, equation (18) shows that the growth rate of total output is
gy = gz + n. Per capita consumption is ct = yt=Lt, implying that ct and Zt must grow at
the same rate: gc = gz. Therefore, we have the balanced growth rate (the growth rate of
per capita consumption or output) as

c
c
= 'lr;t ln , (20)
which is a decreasing function of the fertility rate, using (16).
Equations (20) and (16) indicate that there is no direct e¤ect of the nominal interest
rate on the balanced growth rate. This is the standard result with an inelastic labor
supply and a CIA constraint on consumption only (see also Chu and Cozzi, 2014). With
an inelastic labor supply, a higher nominal interest would not distort the labor supply
through the consumption-leisure choice (i.e., the choice for leisure is absent). When the
CIA constraint applies only on consumption (i.e., not on R&D labor or manufacturing), a
higher nominal interest would not distort the allocation of labor between manufacturing
and R&D, leaving the balanced growth rate una¤ected. Therefore, in our model, there
exists only an indirect e¤ect of the nominal interest rate on the balanced growth rate,
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which is through its e¤ect on fertility choice.
Thus, as long as we pin down the equilibrium fertility rate, we can solve for the
balanced growth rate and then evaluate the e¤ect of the nominal interest rate on the
economy. Plugging the equilibrium conditions into (5) and using equation (3), we have
 (1 + i)
n
=
(   1)
 (+ 'lr)
+
1
lx
+ 1, (21)
where we have used the equilibrium conditions: at = vt=Lt = t(+)Lt =
 1

yt
(+)Lt
, which
gives the rst term in the right-hand side (RHS) of (21); wt = yt= (Lx), which gives the
second term in the RHS of (21); and mt = ct, which yields the third term in the RHS of
(21).
Solving (14), (15), and (21) yields equilibrium fertility as the solution to the quadratic
function
'n2   [(1 + i) '+  (+ ') +  + ']n+  (+ ') (1 + i) = 0. (22)
After solving for the equilibrium fertility, equations (16) and (17) will solve manufac-
turing labor lx (and also R&D labor lr).
Solving (22), we have
n =
p2   4' (+ ') (1 + i)
2'
, (23)
where  = (1 + i) '+  (+ ') +  + '.
We rewrite (21), using equation (14) to substitute for (+ 'lr) with (   1)'lx, as
lx =
 + '
'
n
 (1 + i)  n , (24)
which we refer to as the F curve.
We also rewrite (17) as
lx = 1  n

+

'
, (25)
which we refer to as the M curve.
Now equations (24) and (25) govern the equilibrium of the economic system. The M
curve is a downward-sloping straight line with n on the horizontal axis, and the F curve
is a hyperbola. As seen in Figure 1, the two curves must intersect twice. However, the
higher fertility rate equilibrium naturally involves negative values of manufacturing labor
lx, which cannot be an equilibrium. Therefore, Figure 1 illustrates that our model has
one unique equilibrium with fertility as the smaller root of (23).
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Figure 1. Steady-state equilibrium.
2.8 Monetary Policy and Fertility
Before we prove how an increase in the nominal interest rate a¤ects the fertility rate
mathematically, we can show it with Figure 1. Equation (25) shows that the M curve
is not a function of the nominal interest rate, so the M curve remains unchanged by an
increase in the nominal interest rate. In contrast, Figure 1 illustrates that an increase
in the nominal interest rate would shift the vertical asymptote of the hyperbola, which
rotates the F curve rightwards. As a result, the equilibrium fertility rate increases and
the manufacturing labor lx (and also R&D labor lr) would decrease.
Mathematically, as illustrated above, our model has one unique equilibrium with fer-
tility as the smaller root of (23), which is
n =
 p2   4' (+ ') (1 + i)
2'
. (26)
Therefore, we have
@n
@i
>
1
2'
0@@
@i
 
@
p
2

@i
1A = 0. (27)
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The intuition behind equation (27) can be seen from equations (5) and (3). Equation
(5) indicates that the marginal utility of fertility (i.e., =nt) equals the marginal cost of
fertility (i.e., (at + wt= +mt) = [ct (1 + i)]). The rst and the second terms are the same
as in Chu et al. (2013). That is, the rst term is the asset-diluting e¤ect of fertility,
while the second is the foregone-wage e¤ect of fertility. The third term is the real money
balance-diluting e¤ect. All else equal, according to equation (3), the marginal utility of
consumption depends positively on the nominal interest rate. This is because the CIA
constraint applies to consumption, which increases the e¤ective price of consumption
from 1 to (1 + i). Therefore, all else equal, a higher nominal interest rate decreases the
right-hand side of equation (5) (i.e., the marginal cost of fertility), thereby increasing the
fertility rate. In other words, the CIA constraint on consumption makes fertility cheaper
relative to consumption, which in turn increases fertility.
The increase in fertility decreases the amount of labor supplied to production and R&D
(see equation (15)), which ends up decreasing the balanced growth rate. For instance,
Li, Yi, and Zhang (2015) nd a negative correlation between fertility and parental labor
supply in OLS (ordinary least squares) estimation using Chinese data. Although they nd
no evidence of the negative e¤ects of fertility on parental labor supply with twinning as
a natural experiment, they suggest that the negative e¤ects of fertility on parental labor
supply are mitigated by the childcare provided by grandparents.
Proposition 1 In our model, the growth rate is a decreasing function of the nominal in-
terest rate, while fertility is an increasing function of the nominal interest rate. Moreover,
fertility is an increasing function of the ination rate.
Proof: The rst part is proven in the text. We now prove that fertility is also an increasing
function of the ination rate. On the balanced growth path, we have  = i   g (i)  .
Given an increase in the nominal interest rate, we have g0 (i) < 0. This is because
g0 (i) =  ' (   1) ln 

@n
@i
< 0. (28)
Therefore, there is a positive relationship between the nominal interest rate and the
ination rate. Taken together, we observe that fertility is an increasing function of the
ination rate. Q.E.D.
The intuition is already discussed. In the following we empirically test the prediction
of our model. However, the nominal interest rate is di¢ cult to observe across countries.
In contrast, data on the rate of ination is widely accessible and reliable. Because the
ination rate is determined by the nominal interest rate through the Fisher equation, we
test the e¤ect of the ination rate on the fertility rate to check the validity of our theory
and further evaluate the importance/magnitude of the channel that we emphasize.
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Before the regression analysis in Section 3, we would like to calibrate the model and
simulate the quantitative e¤ects of ination on growth and social welfare to further in-
crease the empirical appeals of the paper.
2.9 Quantitative Analysis
Our model has the following set of structural parameters f; ; '; ; g. We follow Chu,
Ning, and Zhu (2017) to set the discount rate  to a convential value of 0.04 and the step
size of innovation  to 1.05. We need three conditions to pin down the values of f'; ; g.
The rst condition is the long-run GDP per capita growth of 2% in advanced countries
(see Chu et al., 2017; Chu and Cozzi, 2014). The second condition is a 0.89% population
growth rate in our data sample (see Section 3 for details). We need another condition. In
Section 3, we will regress population growth on the ination rate to test the predictions
of our model. In this case we have @n
@
= @n
@i
@i
@
. If we have @i
@
, we can recover @n
@i
= @n
@
= @i
@
.
However, as discussed above, the nominal interest rate set by the monetary authorities is
di¢ cult to observe across countries, and we do not have the necessary data. Nevertheless,
our model has it =

M t=Mt + , and we have the data on monetary growth rates. As
an alternative, we regress population growth on the money growth rate Money_growth,
and we used the indicator the broad money growth (annual %) in the Financial Sector
section of the World Bank indicators (see Section 3 for details), controlling for xed
country e¤ects and time e¤ects. The regression results are as follows:
popnit = 0:35 + 0:0035(Money_growth)it + i + Tt + "it, (29)
where i and Tt stand for the country xed e¤ects and year xed e¤ects, respectively.
Therefore, we take the predicted value of 0:0035 for @n
@i
. Now we pin down the values of
f'; ; g by solving the following three equations:
 + '
'
n
 (1 + i)  n  

1  n

+

'

= 0, (30)
g = '

(   1)


1  n

+

'

  
'

ln  = 0:02, (31)
@n
@i
= 0:0035, (32)
where n is given in equation (26).
Solving equations (30)-(32) yields the values of f'; ; g to be f21:96; 1:22; 0:0156g. To
summarize, we pin down the parameter values f; ; '; ; g as f0:04; 1:05; 21:96; 1:22; 0:0156g.
Columns 1.1 and 1.2 of Table 1 report the calibration results for i = 0:096 and i = 0,
respectively, where i = 0:096 is our calculated sample value because i =  + r =
 +  + g + n (our sample mean of ination rate is 2.71%). By reducing the nominal
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interest rate from 9.6% to 0%, the growth gain is 0.12% annually, and the welfare gain
U is equivalent to a permanent increase in consumption of 3.14%.
Figure 1 also illustrates some interesting comparative statics. For instance, the para-
meter , which governs peoples preference for children, works similarly with an increase
in the nominal interest rate. We can also conduct some conterfactuals to evaluate the
e¤ect of a change in  on growth and social welfare. Columns 1.3 and 1.4 present the
counterfactual results of  = 4 for i = 0:096 and i = 0, respectively. The results indicate
that the growth and welfare e¤ects depend on the size of . An increase in  means people
prefer more children. In this case, the growth and welfare gains by reducing the nominal
interest rate from 9.6% to 0% are much smaller. Additionally, one can observe that an
increase in  reduces the balanced growth rate. This is discussed above and illustrated
in Figure 1. Comparing results in columns 1.1 and 1.3, when  increases from 1.22 to 4,
growth decreases from 2% to 0.76%. The loss in growth is large. The welfare loss is also
large (not shown).
Table 1: Calibration Results
Column number
1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4
f; ; '; g = f0:04; 1:05; 21:96; 0:0156g
 = 1:22  = 4
i 9.6% 0% 9.6% 0%
lx 0.41 0.43 0.1778 0.1914
lr 0.019 0.020 0.0071 0.0077
n 0.89% 0.85% 1.27% 1.25%
g 2.00% 2.12% 0.76% 0.83%
U n/a 3.14% n/a 0.00%
Note: i is the nominal interest rate.
lx and lr are the manufacturing labor and R&D labor, respectively.
n is the population growth rate, and g is per capita growth rate.
U is the welfare gain (equivalent to a permanent increase in consumption).
3 Data
3.1 Empirical Specication
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Before we construct the variables, we present the empirical specication:
popnit = 1it + 2(Controls) + i + Tt + "it, (33)
where popnit is the average annual growth rate of population during period t for country
i; it is the average annual ination rate during period t for country i. Controls are
the other explanatory variables (explained below). i and Tt stand for the country xed
e¤ects and year xed e¤ects, respectively.
To obtain more control variables in order to avoid the potential omitted variable bias,
we include the following explanatory variables. The rst one is infant mortality rate,
denoted Mortality. It is included because a higher mortality rate would decrease the
population growth rate. Moreover, we will check the robustness of our results by using
the birth rate and the fertility rate as the dependent variables. In order to have o¤spring
that survive to adulthood, people tend to give birth to more children when the expected
rate of mortality is high.
The second control variable is related to human capital. Considering the quality-
quantity trade-o¤ for raising children (see e.g., Li, Zhang, and Zhu, 2008; Galor and
Mountfold, 2008; Rosenzweig and Zhang, 2009), we include a human capital indicator,
denoted Human. A higher level of human capital decreases the time devoted to raising
more children, ultimately decreasing the population growth rate. For instance, Rosen-
zweig and Zhang (2009) nd evidence of a signicant trade-o¤ between the number of
children and child quality in China. Li, Zhang, and Zhu (2008) use data from the Chinese
Population Census and nd a negative e¤ect of family size on childrens education.
Additionally, more advanced countries tend to have lower population growth. That is,
we control for per capita level of output. The last control variable is the physical capital
investment rate, denoted I/GDP. It is included because investments may impact growth,
thereby a¤ecting population growth.
3.2 Identication Strategy
In aggregate level studies, there is always a possibility of endogeneity. That is, it is
possible that there may be a feedback e¤ect from population growth to the ination rate.
For instance, higher population growth might decrease economic growth (Chu et al., 2013)
as bidirectional causality may exist between growth and ination, as argued in the sizeable
literature on the ination-growth nexus (e.g., He and Zou, 2016, and references therein).
Therefore, the OLS estimation would be biased.
In this paper we use IV estimation to deal with the potential endogeneity of the
ination rate. It is di¢ cult to nd a suitable instrument for the ination rate. In another
study we nd that CBI has a signicant e¤ect on the ination rate only in advanced
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countries. Therefore, we use CBI as the instrument for the ination rate. CBI changes
slowly over time, which indicates that there may be no feedback e¤ect from population
growth to CBI.
Moreover, as discussed in the theoretical model, we have it =

M t=Mt + . Combining
with Proposition 1 indicates that the money growth rate would also impact the population
growth rate. Therefore, to check the robustness of our results, we will also use the
money growth rate as an additional instrument. With more instruments than endogenous
variables, we can use the over-identifying tests to check the validity of the instruments,
despite the fact that the tests are known to have little statistical power.
3.3 Data Sample
For some of the variables, we use World Bank indicators. For the rest of the control
variables, we use the recent Penn World Table (PWT) 9.0 (explained by Feenstra et al.,
2014). PWT 9.0 provides the most complete and most recent data for all the countries
during 19502014. We exclude from our sample countries that do not have data on
employment (the emp series in PWT 9.0) and/or human capital (the hc series in PWT
9.0). This leaves us with 144 countries in the sample.
For the measure of CBI, we follow the recent study of Dincer and Eichengreen (2014).
Dincer and Eichengreen (2014) do not report data on CBI for countries with the euro
as their currency. Moreover, some countries in Dincer and Eichengreen (2014) do not
have data on employment and/or human capital. Taken together, this leaves us with 68
countries.
Out of the 68 countries, 12 are advanced namely, Australia, Canada, U.K., Iceland,
Israel, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Norway, New Zealand, Singapore, Sweden, and the
United States. As discussed above, in another study we nd that CBI has a signicant
e¤ect on the ination rate only in advanced countries. Therefore, our nal sample has 12
advanced countries.
Because the CBI sample in Dincer and Eichengreen (2014) covers 19982010, we use
the sample 20002014. Following the common practice in the literature on empirical
growth (e.g., Aghion et al., 2009), we take ve-year averages of the data (unless indicated
otherwise), yielding three sub-periods: 20002004, 20052009, and 20102014. The CBI
data before each sup-period are used. That is, the CBI data (in Table 9 of Dincer
and Eichengreen, 2014) in years 1999, 2004, and 2009 are used for sub-periods 2000
2004, 20052009, and 20102014, respectively. Therefore, our nal sample consists of 12
countries during 20002014 (15 years), providing a balanced panel of 36 observations.
3.4 Measuring the Population Growth and the Ination Rate
The recent PWT 9.0 provides the most complete and recent data on total population for
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all the countries during 19502014. We take the population data for our 12 advanced
countries during 20002014. Because we are taking ve-year averages of the data, we
calculate the annual growth rate of the population during each sub-period, denoted popn.
For instance, the average annual growth rate of population for sub-period 20002004
would be [log(population in 2004)-log(population in 2000)]/4.
To check the robustness of our results, we also use other measures of the dependent
variable. For instance, we have used the birth rate and the fertility rate as the dependent
variable. For the birth rate, we used the indicator crude birth rate (per 1,000 people)
in the Health section of the World Bank indicators, denoted Birth_rate. For the fertility
rate, we used the indicator total fertility rate (births per woman) in the Health section
of the World Bank indicators, denoted Fertility.
Following existing studies (e.g., Aghion et al., 2009), we measure the ination rate
 as the percentage change in the consumer price index (CPI). The PWT 9.0 does not
provide data on CPI. We acquire the CPI data from the International Financial Statistics
(IFS) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to obtain the data on CPI for over
100 countries (including the 12 countries in our sample) during 19502015. Our results
remain robust to the transformed measures of the ination. For instance, in the literature
on the CBI-ination nexus, researchers also used the logarithm of (1+ination rate) (see
e.g., Dincer and Eichengreen, 2014). Our results remain robust to using the logarithm of
(1+ination rate) as the measure of the ination rate (results not reported, but available
upon request).
3.5 Measuring the Instruments
The seminal study of Bade and Parkin (1988) was among the rst to empirically inves-
tigate variations in the degree of CBI across countries. Following this, there emerged a
large body of literature measuring CBI (see e.g., Alesina [1988], Cukierman, Webb, and
Neyapti [1992], and Alesina and Summers [1993] for early studies, and Dincer and Eichen-
green [2014] for recent contributions). We use the most recent data on CBI from Dincer
and Eichengreen (2014) (DE hereafter). DE report updated measures of independence
for more than 100 central banks during 19982010. DE follow Cukierman, Webb, and
Neyapti (1992) (CWN hereafter) but add other aspects of CBI emphasized in the subse-
quent literature to measure CBI. Specically, DE use the 16 criteria employed by CWN
and 8 additional criteria (24 in total, see DE, 218219 for details).
DE rst aggregate their 24 criteria into 9 criteria as follows: (1) The ve variables
regarding appointment of the CEO are aggregated into one using equal weights; (2) the
four variables under policy formulation are aggregated into one using equal weights; (3)
the objectives criterion stands on its own as number 3; (47) the rst four criteria on
limits on lending are each treated as a separate variable, (8) the last four criteria on
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limits on lending are aggregated into a single variable using equal weights; and (9) the
criteria regarding board members is treated as a single variable (DE, p. 219). Each
criterion is coded on a scale of 0 (lowest degree of CBI) to 1 (highest degree of CBI). The
nal aggregate measure on CBI also ranges from 0 to 1 (lowest and highest degrees of
CBI, respectively).
We use the unweighted average of the nine aggregated variables (i.e., CBIU in Table
9 of DE) to measure CBI, denoted CBI. As discussed, the CBI data in years 1999, 2004,
and 2009 are used for sub-periods 20002004, 20052009, and 20102014, respectively.
As CBI does change over time, we report the results from panel data regressions. The
advantage of panel data regression is that it allows us to control for xed country e¤ects.
We have checked the results from cross-country regressions, and we have found that they
di¤er a lot from those of panel data regressions. Therefore, cross-country regressions
without controlling for country xed e¤ects would su¤er from the bias from omitting such
e¤ects.
For the money growth rate Money_growth, we used the indicator broad money
growth (annual %) in the Financial Sector section of the World Bank indicators. We
then take ve-year averages of the data.
3.6 Measuring Control Variables
For the infant mortality rate (Mortality), we have used the World Bank indicators to
get the data. We used the indicator infant mortality rate per 1,000 live births in the
Health section of the World Bank indicators.
According to Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer (2015, p. 3157), If the sole object is to
compare the growth performance of economies, we would recommend using the RGDPNA
series (and this is closest to earlier versions of PWT).Thus, we use the RGDPNA series
to measure real GDP. Dividing the RGDPNA series by the emp series in PWT 9.0 would
yield real GDP per employment that measures per capita level of output in our study. To
mitigate its potential endogeneity problem, we use initial real GDP per employment (i.e.,
(GDP=emp)t 1) that takes the value of the previous year. The human capital indicator
Human is measured by the hc series in PWT 9.0. The physical capital investment rate
I=GDP is measured by the csh_i series in PWT 9.0. Table 2 presents the summary
statistics of the nal data.
[Table 2 Here]
4 Estimation Results
4.1 Least Squares Dummy Variables Estimation
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We rst use the LSDV (least squares dummy variables) estimation (i.e., OLS estimation
that includes 12 country dummies and 3 time dummies) and present the results in Table
3.
According to regression 3.1 in Table 3, when the population growth rate (popn) is the
dependent variable, the estimated coe¢ cient on the ination rate is negative, which is
insignicant at the 10% level. That is, a higher level of ination rate is insignicantly
and negatively associated with population growth in the 12 advanced economies during
2000-2014. The estimated coe¢ cient on the infant mortality rate (Mortality) is negative
as expected, which is insignicant at the 10% level. The estimated coe¢ cient on the
human capital indicator (ln(Human)) is negative and signicant at the 10% level, as
expected. The estimated coe¢ cient on physical capital investment rate (ln(I=GDP )) is
positive and signicant at the 5% level. The estimated coe¢ cient on the income level
(ln(GDP=emp)t 1) is positive and insignicant. The R-squared is 0.95, meaning our
empirical specication ts the cross-country population data quite well.
It is very possible that the observations are independent across groups (i.e., countries)
but not necessarily within groups. Therefore, we allow for intragroup correlation (i.e., the
correlation of observations over time for each country). This is reasonable because the
population growth rate for each country may be correlated over time. However, it is hard
to support that the population growth rates across countries are correlated. For example,
the population growth rates of Japan may be correlated over time, but they would be
uncorrelated with those of the United States. Specically, we cluster the time dummies
and use cluster-robust standard errors. The results are presented in regress 3.2 of Table
3. The results remain similar to those in regression 3.1.
According to regression 3.3 in Table 3, when the birth rate (Birth_rate) is the depen-
dent variable, the estimated coe¢ cient on the ination rate is positive as expected, which
is insignicant at the 10% level. The estimated coe¢ cients on the other control variables
all become insignicant. This is why we believe the population growth rate may be more
suitable for our purpose. According to regression 3.5 in Table 3, when the fertility rate
(Fertility) is the dependent variable, the estimated coe¢ cient on the ination rate is
positive as expected, which is insignicant at the 10% level. The estimated coe¢ cients
on the other control variables all become insignicant. Regressions 3.4 and 3.6 indicate
that the results remain similar when we use cluster-robust standard errors.
[Table 3 Here]
4.2 IV Estimation
As discussed, there is always a possibility of endogeneity (either from omitting important
variables or from reverse causality) in aggregate-level studies. We have used CBI and
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money growth as instruments. We use the most e¢ cient 2SLS (two-stage least squares)
estimation. Additionally, as discussed above, we allow for intragroup correlation and use
cluster-robust standard errors.
The corresponding 2SLS estimation results for LSDV regressions 3.2, 3.4, and 3.6 are
presented in Tables 4 and 5. Table 4 presents the rst-stage results, and the corresponding
second-stage results are in Table 5. Regression 4.1 of Table 4 reports the rst-stage results
with CBI as the sole instrument. The results indicate that the estimated coe¢ cient on
the instrument CBI is signicant at the 1% level, indicating that CBI has a signicant
e¤ect on the ination rate in advanced countries during 2000-2014. In other words, the
instrument is strong.
[Table 4 Here]
Table 5 presents the corresponding second-stage results of the 2SLS estimation. Ac-
cording to regression 5.1 in Table 5, when the population growth rate (popn) is the de-
pendent variable, the estimated coe¢ cient on the ination rate becomes positive, which
is signicant at the 1% level. That is, a higher level of ination rate signicantly increases
population growth in the 12 advanced economies during 2000-2014. The estimated coef-
cient on the infant mortality rate (Mortality) remains negative as expected, which be-
comes signicant at the 1% level. The estimated coe¢ cient on the human capital indicator
(ln(Human)) remains negative and becomes signicant at the 1% level. The estimated
coe¢ cient on physical capital investment rate (ln(I=GDP )) remains positive and signif-
icant at the 1% level. The estimated coe¢ cient on the income level (ln(GDP=emp)t 1)
remains insignicant.
The results remain similar when we use both CBI and money growth as the instru-
ments, as indicated in regression 5.2 of Table 5. Because robust tests of overidentifying
restrictions after 2SLS estimation are not available with cluster-robust standard errors,
we have used robust standard errors (i.e., we allow for both intragroup and intergroup
correlations). The results are not reported but are available upon request. Nevertheless,
the estimated coe¢ cient on the ination rate remains positive and signicant at the 5%
level. Moreover, the over-identication test yields a p-value 0.86, meaning the instruments
are valid.
According to regression 5.3 in Table 5, when the birth rate (Birth_rate) is the depen-
dent variable, the estimated coe¢ cient on the ination rate remains positive and becomes
signicant at the 1% level. The estimation results on the other control variables remain
similar to those in regression 5.1. Regression 5.4 of Table 5 indicates that the results
remain similar with both CBI and money growth as the two instruments.
According to regression 5.5 in Table 5, when the fertility rate (Fertility) is the depen-
dent variable, the estimated coe¢ cient on the ination rate remains positive and becomes
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signicant at the 10% level. The estimation results on the other control variables remain
similar to those in regression 5.1. Regression 5.6 of Table 5 indicates that the estimated
coe¢ cient on the ination rate remains positive and becomes signicant at the 5% level
with both CBI and money growth as the two instruments.
[Table 5 Here]
Andrews and Stock (2005) state that now the common approach is to use 2SLS if
instruments are strong and to adopt a robust strategy if instruments are weak. With
weak instruments, Stock and Yogo (2002) show that LIML (limited-information maximum
likelihood) estimation is far superior to 2SLS. We have checked the robustness of our
results with the LIML estimation. The corresponding second-stage results of the LIML
estimation are presented in Table 6. One can observe that our results remain almost
identical to those in Table 5.
[Table 6 Here]
Therefore, the positive, signicant e¤ect of ination on population growth is robust
and causal. Using regression 5.1, we nd that an increase of 1 percentage point in annual
ination would bring an increase of 0.06 percentage point in the annual growth of the total
population. Given the average annual ination rate of 2.71% in our data sample, ination
explains 0.17% of the annual growth in the total population (which is around 20% of the
average 0.89% annual growth rate in the total population in the 12 advanced economies
during 20002014). Therefore, the magnitude of the estimated e¤ect of ination on total
population growth is large in the 12 advanced economies during 20002014.
5 Conclusion
This study explores the growth e¤ects of monetary policy in a scale-invariant Schum-
peterian growth model with endogenous fertility. We model money demand via a CIA
constraint on consumption. We nd a positive e¤ect of an increase in the nominal interest
rate on fertility. A higher nominal interest rate and thereby a higher ination rate via the
CIA constraint on consumption makes consumption more expensive relative to fertility,
ending up in increasing fertility. The increase in fertility decreases labor supplied to pro-
duction and R&D, which in turn decreases long-run growth. In contrast, with an inelastic
labor supply and the CIA constraint on consumption, fertility and growth do not depend
on the ination rate with exogenous fertility.
We calibrate the model to estimate the growth and welfare e¤ects of a change in
the nominal interest rate. We nd that long-run growth increases 0.12% by reducing
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the nominal interest rate from 9.6% (the sample mean, elaborated below) to 0%. The
corresponding welfare gain is equivalent to a permanent increase in consumption of 3.14%.
As a counterfactual, we nd that the growth and welfare losses are smaller when people
prefer more children. Additionally, there are substantial growth and welfare losses when
peoples preference for children increases, all else being equal.
As an empirical test, we build panel data for 12 advanced countries during 20002014.
We use the degree of central bank independence and money growth as the instruments for
ination. We nd the following. The e¤ect of ination on population growth is positive
and signicant in IV estimation. Our results remain robust to using the birth rate and
fertility rate as the dependent variables. Thus, our empirical ndings provide support for
our theory. Moreover, our empirical evaluation indicates that the magnitude of the e¤ect
of monetary policy on population growth is large and signicant. Therefore, our study
helps us to understand the long-run dynamics of the total population. Our study also has
rich policy implications if one country wants to manipulate its population growth in an
ageing era. In-depth study in this area is important, and we leave it to future researchers.
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APPENDIX: HOUSEHOLDS DYNAMIC OPTIMIZATION
We show the steps of solving the households dynamic optimization problem using Hamil-
tionian. Households Hamiltonian function is
Ht = ln ct+ lnnt+t

(rt   nt) at + wt

1  nt


  ct   (t + nt)mt +  t

+vt (mt   ct) .
The rst-order conditions include
@Ht
@ct
=
1
ct
  t   vt = 0, (34)
@Ht
@nt
=

nt
  t

at +
wt

+mt

= 0, (35)
@Ht
@at
= t (rt   nt) = t  

t, (36)
@Ht
@mt
=  t (t + nt) + vt = t  

t. (37)
Combining (36) and (37) yields vt = t (rt + t) = tit, where it is the nominal interest
rate. Plugging this condition into (34) yields
1
ct
= t (1 + it) , (38)
which is (3) in the main text.
Rewriting (36) as
 

t
t
= rt   nt    (39)
yields the intertemporal optimality condition (4) in the main text.
Equation (35) is the optimal condition for fertility in equation (5) in the main text.
23
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
popn (%) 36 0.89 0.56  0.08 2.21
Birth_rate 36 1.82 0.45 1.16 3.03
Fertility 36 12.72 3.20 8.24 21.52
Mortality 36 3.98 1.41 1.82 6.96
 (%) 36 2.71 1.88  0.52 8.19
ln(GDP/emp)t 1 36 11.27 0.28 10.77 11.99
ln(Human) 36 1.22 0.08 0.99 1.31
ln(I/GDP) 36 3.24 0.21 2.81 3.68
Note: the data are from the PWT 9.0 (unless indicated otherwise), covering 12 countries
during 2000-2014.  is the ination rate using the CPI data of IFS of IMF.
Birth_rate, Fertility, and Mortality are the crude birth rate (per 1,000 people), the total
fertility rate (births per woman), and the infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births), respectively.
The data on birth_rate, fertility, and Mortality are from the World Bank indicators.
GDP/emp is real GDP per employment (in 2011 us$). Human measures human capital.
I/GDP is the investment rate.
The variables are are multiplied by 100 before taking logarithms.
24
Table 3. LSDV Regressions
Regression number
3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6
Dependent variable as
Indep. Variable popn popn Birth_rate Birth_rate Fertility Fertility

 0.003
(0.03)
 0.003
(0.03)
0.01
(0.10)
0.01
(0.02)
0.003
(0.01)
0.003
(0.005)
Mortality
 0.12
(0.18)
 0.12
(0.13)
0.32
(0.56)
0.32
(0.45)
0.02
(0.07)
0.02
(0.05)
ln (Human)
 3.05
(1.04)
 3.05
(0.30)
 8.20
(5.04)
 8.20
(4.14)
 1.12
(0.68)
 1.12
(0.56)
ln (I=GDP )
0.72
(0.27)
0.72
(0.27)
1.14
(0.82)
1.14
(0.38)
0.16
(0.11)
0.16
(0.07)
ln

GDP
emp

t 1
0.02
(1.28)
0.02
(0.55)
 1.80
(3.92)
 1.80
(1.12)
0.01
(0.53)
0.01
(0.20)
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.95 0.95 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99
Observations 36 36 36 36 36 36
Note:  is the ination rate using the CPI data of IFS of IMF.
popn is the average annual growth rate of total population.
Birth_rate, Fertility, and Mortality are the crude birth rate (per 1,000 people), the total
fertility rate (births per woman), and the infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births), respectively.
The data on Birth_rate, Fertility, and Mortality are from the World Bank indicators.
Human is human capital. I/GDP is investment rate.
GDP/emp is real GDP (in 2011 us $) per employment.
***Signicant at the 0.01 level, ** at the 0.05 level, * at the 0.10 level
(3.1, 3.3, 3.5: standard errors in parentheses)
(3.2, 3.4, 3.6: cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses)
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Table 4. 2SLS Regressions
First-stage results (rst-stage dep. vari.: )
Regression number
Indep. Variable 4.1 4.2
CBI
6.42
(1.70)
6.42
(1.74)
Money_growth
 0.01
(0.06)
Mortality
2.84
(1.36)
2.87
(1.62)
ln (Human)
 11.94
(12.86)
 12.17
(14.09)
ln (I=GDP )
 1.84
(1.79)
 1.79
(2.04)
ln

GDP
emp

t 1
15.58
(9.50)
15.69
(10.09)
Time FE YES YES
Country FE YES YES
R2 0.80 0.80
Observations 36 36
Note:  is the ination rate using the CPI data of IFS of IMF.
CBI is the degree of central bank independence.
Money_growth is the broad money growth from the World Bank indicators. Mortality
is the infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) from the World Bank indicators.
Human is human capital. I/GDP is investment rate.
GDP/emp is real GDP (in 2011 us $) per employment.
***Signicant at the 0.01 level, ** at the 0.05 level, * at the 0.10 level
(cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses)
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Table 5. 2SLS Regressions (second-stage results)
Regression number
5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6
Dependent variable as
Indep. Variable popn popn Birth_rate Birth_rate Fertility Fertility

0.06
(0.01)
0.06
(0.01)
0.07
(0.03)
0.08
(0.02)
0.007
(0.004)
0.008
(0.004)
Mortality
 0.31
(0.11)
 0.32
(0.11)
0.15
(0.23)
0.13
(0.23)
0.004
(0.03)
0.001
(0.03)
ln (Human)
 2.32
(0.75)
 2.33
(0.74)
 7.59
(1.36)
 7.50
(1.33)
 1.08
(0.23)
 1.07
(0.23)
ln (I=GDP )
0.82
(0.12)
0.82
(0.12)
1.23
(0.18)
1.24
(0.16)
0.17
(0.04)
0.17
(0.03)
ln

GDP
emp

t 1
 1.23
(1.08)
 1.22
(1.08)
 2.85
(1.49)
 3.00
(1.48)
 0.06
(0.22)
 0.08
(0.21)
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.93 0.93 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99
Observations 36 36 36 36 36 36
Note:  is the ination rate using the CPI data of IFS of IMF.
popn is the average annual growth rate of total population.
Birth_rate, Fertility, and Mortality are the crude birth rate (per 1,000 people), the total
fertility rate (births per woman), and the infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births), respectively.
The data on Birth_rate, Fertility, and Mortality are from the World Bank indicators.
Human is human capital. I/GDP is investment rate.
GDP/emp is real GDP (in 2011 us $) per employment.
Instruments used: 5.1, 5.3, and 5.5: CBI ; 5.2, 5.4, and 5.6: CBI and Money_growth.
***Signicant at the 0.01 level, ** at the 0.05 level, * at the 0.10 level
(cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses)
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Table 6. LIML Regressions (second-stage results)
Regression number
6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6
Dependent variable as
Indep. Variable popn popn Birth_rate Birth_rate Fertility Fertility

0.06
(0.01)
0.06
(0.01)
0.07
(0.03)
0.09
(0.02)
0.007
(0.004)
0.008
(0.004)
Mortality
 0.31
(0.11)
 0.32
(0.11)
0.15
(0.23)
0.10
(0.22)
0.004
(0.03)
 0.001
(0.03)
ln (Human)
 2.32
(0.75)
 2.33
(0.74)
 7.59
(1.36)
 7.39
(1.23)
 1.08
(0.23)
 1.06
(0.22)
ln (I=GDP )
0.82
(0.12)
0.82
(0.12)
1.23
(0.18)
1.26
(0.15)
0.17
(0.04)
0.17
(0.03)
ln

GDP
emp

t 1
 1.23
(1.08)
 1.23
(1.08)
 2.85
(1.49)
 3.19
(1.55)
 0.06
(0.22)
 0.10
(0.23)
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
R2 (centered) 0.93 0.93 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99
Observations 36 36 36 36 36 36
Note:  is the ination rate using the CPI data of IFS of IMF.
popn is the average annual growth rate of total population.
Birth_rate, Fertility, and Mortality are the crude birth rate (per 1,000 people), the total
fertility rate (births per woman), and the infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births), respectively.
The data on Birth_rate, Fertility, and Mortality are from the World Bank indicators.
Human is human capital. I/GDP is investment rate.
GDP/emp is real GDP (in 2011 us $) per employment.
Instruments used: 6.1, 6.3, and 6.5: CBI ; 6.2, 6.4, and 6.6: CBI and Money_growth.
***Signicant at the 0.01 level, ** at the 0.05 level, * at the 0.10 level
(cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses)
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